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1. Introduction
In recent times, economic historians have reexamined the antebellum period. Popularly
characterized as having chaotic and “wildcat” banking episodes, economic historians have
sought to find an alternative explanation for the failures of the system. Rolnick and Weber’s
(1983, 1984) review of the period suggested the cause of the failures was not the lack of
regulations, but rather the regulations themselves. The requirement for the free banks to hold
long-term bonds to back short-term liabilities was a recipe for bank panics during the significant
downturn in bond prices. Most investigations have examined the period ex post and focused on
the banks that failed. Only two studies, by Dwyer and Hafer (2003) and Jaremski (2010), have
examined ex ante bank behavior prior to a downturn to determine whether bank failures were
caused by banks that were taking too much risk. As Dwyer and Hafer’s discussed, were these
banks taking excess risk due to lack of regulation or were they instead impacted by an
unexpected and sudden large decline in the price of bonds?
Dwyer and Hafer (2003) found that free banks in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin that
took greater ex ante risk were more likely to fail.1 These assessments of ex ante portfolio risks of
free banks were evaluated further in another study. Jaremski (2010) found that free banks with
greater asset diversification with loans and fewer notes in circulation were more likely to
survive. Previous studies have assessed the ex ante decision making of banks prior to crises and
others have indicated ex post that greater regulation of the banks’ bond portfolios would have
reduced failures. However, these studies do not explain adequately if the banks adjusted their
risks in times of higher market uncertainty in order to avoid potential bankruptcy. For this study,

1

Dwyer and Hasan (2005) then examined the suspension of specie payments in Wisconsin versus in Illinois and
determined that there was a lower likelihood of bank closures and noteholder losses in Wisconsin than Illinois.
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some of the data for bond prices was found sourced from Dwyer (1999), quotations in Banker’s
Magazine, and Sylla (2003). I have also discovered new bond pricing data from issues of the
American Railroad Journal during this period and have combined the prices found in that journal
with the other sources I have listed to use a more complete pricing data for my analysis.
This study will make assessments regarding the ex ante portfolio allocation of the Illinois
free banks to market conditions; however, it will also investigate whether the free banks actively
made changes in their portfolios in response to political developments prior to the Civil War. In
the 1850s, free banks faced two significant declines in bond prices over a short period of time
providing sufficient experience for managers to understand the inherent risks of their portfolio,
but potentially little time to make adjustments. These events should have provided sufficient
uncertainty of Southern debt to warrant Northern banks hedging their portfolios. My analysis
will help explain whether banks were active in managing risk and if they responded to political
events during 1860 up until Lincoln's election.
The decision-making of Illinois free banks in constructing their bond portfolios can be
assessed by examining their choices given the information that was publically available at the
time. Since bond pricing data was published in periodicals and other sources, it is possible to
determine whether banks were properly taking into account the historical risk variability in
constructing their bond portfolio. Two measures of risk are used. Value-at-risk, the amount of
the bank’s portfolio at risk during low likelihood negative events, and the Sharpe ratio, which
helps to measure each bank’s risk per unit of expected return, will be methods of assessing the
security allocation of the ex ante free bank bond portfolios. While these decisions would become
important during the panics of 1854 and 1857, they would also be important later in Illinois’ free
banking period as the Civil War developed and bond prices declined. By looking at what reports
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were available in newspapers at any point in time and changes that free banks made to their bond
holdings on their balance sheets, it will help assess whether banks reacted to events effecting
political risk, such as the nomination of Lincoln as the Republican candidate for President in the
May of 1860. It will not assess changes after the presidential election of 1860, since that would
no longer be an assessment of ex ante decision-making.
The results of the study indicate that both the value-at-risk and the Sharpe ratio decreased
from November of 1858 to November of 1860. For banks that were already in existence in 1858,
however, there was greater value-at-risk and greater amounts of Southern bond holdings in 1860
versus banks that entered the market between 1858 and 1860. For all of the banks in 1860,
greater amounts of Southern bonds were associated with higher levels of value-at-risk and lower
Sharpe ratios. Additionally, using the total market bond portfolio in 1858, which had greater
holdings of Southern bonds, as a benchmark for the 1858-1860 period banks operating in 1858
slightly lowered their value-at-risk over the two years relative to the benchmark in 1858. This
reduction in risk was due to the greater net inflows of lower risk Northern bonds versus Southern
bonds overall from 1858 to 1860. Following the May nomination of Lincoln for the November
presidential election, however, Southern bond net inflows actually increased versus earlier in the
1858-1860 period. Overall, while adjustments were made to the bond portfolios of the Illinois
free banks to reduce Southern bond exposure, the Illinois free banks appeared to be taking undue
risk since the Southern bonds remained a large portion of their portfolio in November 1860
despite indications being from 1858-1860 that they were more risky. This study's addition of
more complete and new price data has allowed for more extensive quantitative analysis of the
free banking era in Illinois, along with analysis of whether the markets reacted to political events
during 1860 prior to the October and November elections.
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2. Free Banking, Illinois Legislation and Early Developments
The period of free banking in the United States from about 1838 to 1860 enabled banks to
begin operations without government charters as long as they met the statutory requirements
including minimum investment with specified state or federal bonds deposited with the Illinois
Auditor and meeting redemption requests for gold specie on demand. This development followed
the dissolution of the Second Bank of the United States that had served as the U.S. central bank
in 1836. In contrast to the prior banking system, free banking made entry into banking more
possible given businessmen had the necessary funds. Free bankers who purchased state or federal
bonds that met the statutory coupon interest rate requirement and deposited them with the Illinois
Auditor were then issued banknotes by the Illinois Auditor. Banknotes of each free bank then
functioned as a paper currency, but, by law, each bank needed to redeem its banknotes for gold
specie on demand. Free banks could then exchange their banknotes with the public in order to
issue loans as well as to add to their gold specie reserves in order to fulfill banknote redemption
requests.2
Free banking was established in Illinois following prolonged political debate. In the
1840s, the Whig Party supported the establishment of a general banking law that would allow
free banking to develop, whereas the Democratic Party favored the banning of banks and instead
supported gold specie being used as a currency.3 The Whigs had opposed a third Bank of the
United States, instead favoring the establishment of local banking that free banking would
permit. Chartered banking had allowed banks to issue notes based on each bank’s equity and

2

Arthur J. Rolnick and Warren E. Weber. “Explaining the Demand for Free Bank Notes.” Journal of Monetary
Economics 2, no. 1 (1988), pg. 4.
3
George Dowrie, The Development of Banking in Illinois (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press,
1913), pg. 132.
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these notes were redeemable in specie. However, free banking would allow entry into the market
to be easier provided that a bank had the necessary capital.4 When the Democrats gained control
of the Illinois state legislature in 1847 and presided over the writing of the 1848 Illinois
Constitution, they included provisions that prohibited the State of Illinois from becoming a
shareholder in any bank and required bank shareholders to be personally liable for bank
liabilities.5 The new Constitution superseded the 1818 Constitution written soon after Illinois
became a state.6 After free banking legislation was passed by the Illinois legislature in 1851, it
was initially vetoed by Illinois Governor Augustus French, a Democrat; however, the legislature
overrode his veto and the legislation became law following a legislatively required referendum.7
The 1851 Illinois legislation was based on the free banking laws of the State of New
York, which were believed to have been successful up to that point.8 The laws initially allowed
banknotes to be issued with the security of both U.S. treasuries and bonds issued by state
governments.9 U.S. treasuries and state bonds, excluding Illinois, were to be valued for note
issuance based on the average price in the prior six months of trading in New York, but not
exceeding the bonds’ par value.10 The law required that Illinois bonds could only be valued at
80% of their market based on the average price in New York trading for the previous 6 months,
but not exceeding the bonds’ par value.11 The haircut applied initially to Illinois bonds was

4

Andrew Economopolous, “The Illinois Free Banking Experience,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking. Vol. 20,
No. 2. (1988), pg. 250.
5
Dowire, The Development of Banking in Illinois, pg. 134.
6
Frank Kopecky and Mary Sherman Harris. “Understanding the Illinois Constitution.” Illinois Bar Foundation (1986),
pg. 2.
7
Dowire, The Development of Banking in Illinois, pg. 138.
8
Ibid. pg. 138
9
th
General Laws of the State of Illinois: Passed by the 17 General Assembly. (Springfield: Lanphier & Walker,
Printers, 1851), pg. 163
10
Ibid. pg. 164
11
Ibid. pg. 163
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intended to promote increased diversification of the free banks’ bond portfolios.12 Additionally,
banknotes could only be issued to a free bank at the market value by the Illinois Auditor if the
bonds had a coupon rate of 6%, with a 50% haircut if the coupon rate was below 6%.13 Each
bank was required to have $50,000 worth of U.S. and state bonds in order to begin operations
and needed to be deposited with the Illinois Auditor.14 If banknotes that were in circulation were
not redeemed by the bank in question in gold specie on demand, the Illinois Auditor was to
redeem these notes following the sale of the bonds deposited with the Illinois Auditor.15 The law
also specified what happened if banks’ bond holdings declined in value and if the bank did not
choose to deposit additional bonds or to redeem enough of their circulation so that their collateral
would be sufficient security for their note issue outstanding.16 Under these circumstances, a free
bank would be closed and noteholders would have their notes redeemed in gold specie following
the sale by the Illinois Auditor in New York City of the state securities that were serving as
collateral for the note issue.17 If the Illinois Auditor did not have sufficient funds after selling the
bond collateral to fully redeem the noteholders, the noteholders would be redeemed in gold
specie based on their pro rata share of banknote circulation outstanding.18
The 1851 law also required three bank commissioners to be appointed by the Governor in
order to oversee the accounting statements and financial conditions of the free banks.19 The
commissioners were to report their audits of the banks to the Illinois Auditor on an annual

12

Benjamin Chabot, et al. Bank Panics, Government Guarantees, and the Long-Run Size of the Financial Sector:
Evidence from Free-Banking America. (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Working Paper, 2013), pg. 15
13
th
Ibid. and 17 General Assembly. pg. 163
14
Ibid. pg. 164
15
Ibid.
16
Report of the Bank Commissioners of the State of Illinois (Springfield: Office of the Bank Commissioners,
December 30, 1854), pg. 3.
17
th
17 General Assembly. pg. 167
18
th
17 General Assembly. pg. 169
19
Ibid. pg. 171
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basis.20 The reports issued on each bank included the amount of bonds held, the value of real
estate, claims on debt issued to other banks, debts owed to other banks, banknotes in circulation,
loans, and holdings of other banks’ banknotes.21 The purpose of the audits was to determine
whether banks were following the free banking laws’ requirements, including the amount of
notes in circulation, average specie on hand, and whether interest charged on loans followed
legal requirements22 The upper limit on interest for debt that was either issued or incurred by a
free bank was placed at 7%, which served as a usury provision of the legislation.23 Shareholders
in each free bank faced double liability for the debts and other liabilities that their bank incurred
if the bank itself failed to meet the liabilities.24
2.1. Cause of Bank Failures
The “wildcat banking” hypothesis for free bank failures was established Hammond
(1957) and Knox (1903).25 Those researchers believed that free banks only having an asset
requirement for establishment allowed banks to make it difficult for noteholders to seek
redemption by establishing in towns with a low population.26 Rockoff (1974) researched the
topic further and discussed how establishing a bank in an area with a low population allowed a
free bank to be issued banknotes and to put them into circulation, but made it difficult for
noteholders to redeem them for gold.27 He then theorized that the so-called “wildcat bankers”

20

Ibid. pg. 172 and “Annual Report of the Bank Commissioners” Banking in Illinois (May 1854), pg. 102.
th
17 General Assembly. pg. 172
22
“Annual Report of the Bank Commissioners” Banking in Illinois (May 1854), pg. 103.
23
th
17 General Assembly. pg. 172
24
th
17 General Assembly. pg. 173
25
Andrew Economopolous, “The Illinois Free Banking Experience,” pg. 251.
26
Ibid.
27
Hugh Rockoff. “The Free Banking Era: A Reexamination.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 6, No. 2:
(May 1974), pg. 148
21
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could profit by receiving banknotes based on the par value of the bond by backing the notes with
bonds trading below par and then putting the banknotes into circulation.28
For purpose of their analysis, Rolnick and Weber (1984) used two criteria to define a
failed bank has having met the wildcat banking explanation: if their bond holdings were trading
below par and if they were in business for less than a year.29 Economopoulos (1988) applied the
Rolnick and Weber criteria to Illinois and found that asset price decline was more responsible for
failures. Only 11 of the 104 banks in Illinois were consistent with the criteria for wildcat banks.30
Seventy-four of the 104 failed banks analyzed failed during periods of declining asset prices,
indicating that the overall market was responsible for more of the bank failures.31 Two of the 104
failed banks analyzed met the criteria of declining asset prices and wildcat banking.32
Futhermore, Economopoulos (1988) used three additional criteria for a wildcat bank: being
operational for less than a year, the town they are located in having less than the 200 residents
statutorily required, and if the bank purchased bonds when the bank would receive more notes
based on the par value than the bond’s actual market value.33 Economopoulos found that 52 of
the Illinois banks had no wildcat characteristics, 37 had at least one wildcat characteristic, and
only one had all three characteristics.34 He concluded that wildcat banking was not the primary
cause of bank failures, instead finding that most free banks failed during periods of declining
asset prices.35 He also found that free banks failing to meet a request from the bank

28

Ibid. pg. 145
Arthur J. Rolnick and Warren E. Weber. “The Causes of Free Bank Failures: A Detailed Examination.” Journal of
Monetary Economics, Vol. 14. (1984) pg. 11
30
Ibid. pg. 24
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid. 254, 261
34
Ibid. 261
35
Ibid.

29
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commissioner to deposit additional securities, in order to meet collateral requirements, was
responsible for more of the failures than banks’ failure to redeem noteholders in gold.36
Subsequent amendments to the free banking law were in reaction to financial panics and
perceived abuses of the banking law by “wildcat bankers.” The term “wildcat banking” refers to
banks that opened for a short-period, and it has been deemed as the cause of free bank failures
and the failure of banks to redeem banknotes. If a decline in the bonds deposited by free banks is
to blame for the failure to redeem banknotes rather than fraudulent activity, the ex ante allocation
of bonds purchased by the free banks and their ability to respond to events in the marketplace is
of greater importance.
2.2 Amendments to the Free Banking Law and Other Developments
Over time, amendments were passed by the Illinois legislature in reaction to how the free
banks functioned and problems that were observed over time. In August of 1853, amendments
were passed by the Illinois legislature in an attempt to prevent the circulation of other certificates
of deposit that had been functioning similarly to banknotes as currency despite the issuing
entities not being organized under the free banking laws of Illinois.37 The provisions of the
amendments stated that any payments made with illegal bills or certificates of deposit were null
and void.38 It allowed the payee to sue to recover payment from anyone who had used the illegal
financial instrument to pay a bill owed to that entity or person.39 The amendments also permitted
the Illinois Auditor to place banks that violated these laws regarding illegal methods of payment

36

Ibid.
Joseph William Charlton, The History of Banking in Illinois Since 1863 (University of Chicago, 1939), pg. 40.
38
th
General Laws of the State of Illinois: Passed by the 18 General Assembly. (Springfield: Lanphier & Walker,
Printers, 1853), pg. 33
39
Ibid.
37
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into liquidation.40 The effect of increasing substitution into legal banknotes would also increase
the amount of loans and other activities that could be initiated by free banks, allowing for the
potential of greater profits.
The 7% interest rate on bank loans that was instituted as a usury provision in the 1851
legislation was not being uniformly followed. In an 1854 report by the Illinois Bank
Commissioners, it was noted that free banks were making loans to other corporate entities that
then made loans at a 10% rate of interest.41 The Commissioners noted that the low valuation of
Illinois bonds at 80% for note issuance decreased the return on those bonds, but if accepted at a
par valuation would allow banks to increase their earnings without exceeding the usury rate.42
2.3 Development of Banking in Illinois and Free Banking Competitors
To understand the context of free banking in Illinois, it is important to recognize how
Chicago grew as a city of economic importance in the United States and how banking
competitors negatively impacted free banking in Chicago and resulted in changes to the free
banking law. Developments regarding transportation in Chicago helped accelerate the city’s
economic dominance, as the Illinois-Michigan canal was completed by April 1848 and thousands
of miles of railroads were emanating from the city by 1854.43 Agricultural produce increasingly
went through Chicago to travel to the eastern United States and Europe following the building of
this infrastructure, as travel west to St. Louis or Galena, Illinois decreased.44 This infrastructure
allowed Chicago to participate more fully in the American economy, with the growth of banks in

40

Ibid.
Report of the Bank Commissioners, (December 30, 1854) pg. 2.
42
Ibid.
43
Charlton, The History of Banking in Illinois Since 1863, pg. 9.
44
Ibid. pg. 10
41
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the city reflecting this development.45 Free banking did not completely dominate the financial
landscape of Illinois, however, as other entities sought to compete with them with the banknote
market. The Chicago Marine and Fire Insurance Company, later known as the Marine Company
of Chicago, had certificates of deposit (CDs) that were readily redeemed for gold, although this
company’s CDs were not usually used as currency.46
Financier George Smith and others, however, were inspired by this company in his
development of the Wisconsin Marine and Fire Insurance Company.47 Free banks criticized the
Wisconsin Company since people who wanted gold specie were more likely to redeem the free
banks’ notes at par rather than redeem Smith’s CDs at a discount.48 The 1853 amendments to the
Illinois banking law made banknote issuance explicitly illegal for companies that were not
authorized to issue notes.49 The competition between the Chicago free banks and the illegal bank
entities did lead all of the Chicago free banks to liquidate prior to the Civil War, except the
Marine Bank which only had a small proportion of Southern securities.50 Since Southern
securities later declined the most in value, having less Southern securities would be
advantageous for a free bank. Free banks in Illinois other than Chicago had to endure the
outbreak of the Civil War and the decline in Southern bond holdings.51 While private banking
and illegal note issue had started off as being more prominent in Illinois, Chicago and the
surrounding region remained of commercial importance and free banknotes would come to be
used as a currency in Chicago instead.

45

Ibid. pg. 32
Ibid. pg. 25
47
Ibid. pg. 25
48
Ibid. pg. 39
49
Ibid. pg. 40
50
Ibid. pg. 46
51
Ibid. pg. 46
46
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2.4 The Panic of 1857 and the 1857 and 1861 Amendments
After the legislature responded to the competition of illegal CD issue, it also sought to
limit the issue of notes as well as making wildcat banking more difficult. Amendments passed in
February of 1857 also served to respond to developments in finance and banking. All state bonds
and U.S. treasuries, including Illinois, were required to be valued for purposes of note issuance at
90% of their market value, rather than the previous valuation of 80% of market value for Illinois
bonds and 100% of market value for all other state bonds and U.S. treasuries, with the amount
received not exceeding the bonds’ par values.52 The haircut on note issuance for Illinois bonds
was reduced since the state was considered to have improved its creditworthiness since the free
banking law was initially passed in 1851.53 A tax was also introduced on the bond deposits held
by the Illinois free banks equal to the then-tax on real estate in Illinois.54 In a provision that
sought to decrease the potential of wildcat banks to be established in remote locations in Illinois
so that note redemption would be difficult, banks were now required to be in a city or town with
a population of 200 or more.55 The usury provisions of the free banking laws were also modified
so that 10% interest would be the maximum that could be demanded of or received by a free
bank.
The 1857 amendments to the Illinois free banking law were instituted prior to the Panic
of 1857, a steep decline in financial markets, later that year. Federal and state bonds were traded,
but the trading of railroad securities expanded in the decade prior to the Panic and they were the

52

th

General Laws of the State of Illinois: Passed by the 20 General Assembly. (Springfield: Lanphier & Walker,
Printers, 1857), pg. 24
53
University of Illinois: Studies in the Social Sciences. (Urbana, IL, University of Illinois, 1913). pg. 143.
54
th
20 General Assembly. pg. 25
55
Ibid.
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primary private securities that traded.56 Increased speculation in railroad securities up until 1857
followed by a decline in optimism in 1857 is one of the causes of the Panic.57 The newspaper
The Ottawa Free Trader commented that, despite the Panic of 1857, confidence remained in
state bonds in the long run since it was believed that states whose bonds declined were solvent.58
The “bears of Wall Street” were instead blamed for the Panic and the subsequent decline in value
for state securities, effectively assessing an increased liquidity risk versus the increased default
risk that emerged as the Civil War started.59 The view that financial panics were seen as
transitory even during them is noteworthy, since banks would want to stay in business if they
believed a recovery in security prices would happen eventually. When war was looming, banks
would not desire to meet calls on their note issues by depositing additional securities or
redeeming holders of banknotes, since the decline in their bond portfolio was a longer term
problem and the bond prices would have already declined substantially.
New York bank loans peaked in August 1857 and declined to their lowest levels during
the Panic by December 1857.60 The contracting of loans and move into liquid positions of gold
by New York banks was criticized at the time by Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine and later J.S.
Gibbons for causing the Panic.61 Gibbons noted that the New York country banks that withdrew
deposits from the New York City banks were to blame for the contracting of loans by those city
banks, however.62 Until late August, the New York money market was functioning normally, but

56

Charles W. Calomiris and Larry Schweikart, “The Panic of 1857: Origins, Transmission, and Containment”,
Journal of Economic History, Vol. 51, No. 4: (Dec. 1991) pg. 809
57
Ibid. pg. 811
58
“The Financial Storm,” Ottawa Free Trader, October 3, 1857.
59
Ibid.
60
J.S. Gibson, The Banks of New York, Their Dealers, The Clearinghouse, and the Panic of 1857 (New York: D.
Appleton and Co., 1858), pg. 348.
61
Calomiris, “The Panic of 1857: Origins, Transmission, and Containment”, Journal of Economic History, pg. 807
62
Ibid.

Clayman 15
it began to enter panic at the end of the month.63 The greatest decline in bond and stock prices in
New York took place from August 22 to October 1.64 While loan collection was becoming very
difficult, banks decided to call their loans back and along with redemption requests from country
banks and depositors led to the suspension of specie payments in New York City on October 14,
1857.65
As the Panic of 1857 spread to Chicago by September, there were consequences for the
local financial system. There was a contraction in the money market in Chicago, as well as high
demand for gold specie, and a limited amount of banknotes from the east were available.66
Illinois and Wisconsin banknotes were widely available in Illinois, but Chicago merchants had
problems exchanging these banknotes for other currencies and therefore could not pay their
eastern debts.67 This diminished trade in general in Illinois, since farmers, merchants, and others
had problems paying their bills in general.68 Although, before the Panic, Illinois banknotes had
served as half of the currency in circulation overall in Missouri their use ceased in St. Louis as
the Panic spread.69 Since the declining Missouri bonds were a large portion of the Illinois bond
portfolios, Missouri was effectively harming their own bond market by refusing to use Illinois
banknotes and they soon resumed their usage.70 By October 17, 1857, there was a bank run on

63

Gibson, The Banks of New York. pg. 353.
Ibid. pg. 358
65
Ibid. pg. 360 and “The Crisis at Last,” New York Times, October 14, 1857.
66
“The Bank Flurry,” Ottawa Free Trader, September 5, 1857.
67
“The Progress of the Pause,” Ottawa Free Trader, October 10, 1857.
68
Ibid.
69
“Illinois Banks in St. Louis,” Ottawa Free Trader, October 10, 1857.
70
Ibid.
This topic is discussed further in "Banks Distance from Missouri"
64
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the Bank of Missouri, the only bank in Missouri legally allowed to issue currency until that same
year.71
Additional amendments to the free banking law were passed by the Illinois legislature in
February of 1861. These amendments allowed only Illinois and U.S. bonds to be held as security
for note issuance by free banks that were starting operations, with preexisting free banks being
able to maintain other states’ bonds as collateral for their note issue.72 This was a response to the
decline in other states’ bond prices as the U.S. Civil War was about to start, as it was thought that
free banks would be able to meet redemption more easily if they had less risky bonds.73 The
amount of notes that could be issued was also increased to the total par value of the bonds.74 The
amount of capital required for a new free bank to enter into operations was decreased from
$50,000 to $25,000.75 The amendments also mandated that new free banks had to be located in
towns or cities with a population of 1,000 or more, increased from the 200 population
requirement in the 1857 amendments.76 The only free bank at that point still in Chicago was the
Marine Bank, however, which had reduced its circulation to $50,000 by the time of the
amendment’s passage.77
2.5. Periods of Free Bank Failures in Illinois
Economopoulos (1988) found three periods of price declines used as a proxy for
Tennessee bonds, during which most the Illinois free banks failed, during the period from 1851
71

“Progress of the Bank Panic,” Ottawa Free Trader, October 17, 1857 and Mark Geiger. “Yale Series in Economic
and Financial History “: Chapter 2 “New Banks”
72
nd
General Laws of the State of Illinois: Passed by the 22 General Assembly. (Springfield: Lanphier & Walker,
Printers, 1861), pg. 39
73
Charlton, The History of Banking in Illinois Since 1863, pg. 47.
74
nd
22 General Assembly. pg. 39
75
nd
22 General Assembly. pg. 46 and Charlton, The History of Banking in Illinois Since 1863, pg. 47.
76
nd
22 General Assembly. pg. 46
77
Charlton, The History of Banking in Illinois Since 1863, pg. 47.
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to 1863. The first period was from March 1854 to December 1854, the second period included
the Panic of 1857 during the period from June 1857 to October 1857, and the third period was
from June 1860 to June 1861.78 Two of the Illinois failures occurred in 1857, when the banks
failed to meet requests to deposit additional securities, and 89 failed during the June 1860 to June
1861 decline.79 During the last price decline, the banking commissioners at times asked
noteholders to receive bonds instead of gold to prevent a precipitous decline further in bond
prices.80
3. Integration of United States Financial Markets
As the Panic of 1857 demonstrated, changes in New York City financial markets spread
throughout the country, resulting in specie payment suspension. Financial integration would also
allow banks in Illinois to recognize and react to changes in bond prices in New York City. It is
important to note, however, that financial integration of the United States was already
established prior to 1857. Greater technological capacity emerged in the early 19th century and
progressed throughout the 19th century, with information transmitted through the telegraph and
the financial press and goods moved on railroads.81 The increased speed of information and
goods flow allowed financial funding to move throughout the United States geographically and
into emerging industries more quickly.82 Regional interest rate differences then decreased and
U.S. financial markets became integrated as the 19th century progressed. Lance Davis found in a
study that, by the middle of the 19th century or earlier, interest rates were equal throughout most
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Andrew Economopolous, “The Illinois Free Banking Experience,” pg. 262.
Ibid.
80
Ibid. 262-263
81
Howard Bodenhorn, A History of Banking in Antebellum America (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2000), pg. 85.
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Ibid. pg. 86.
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the United States.83 Research by Bowdenhorn (2000) also found that interest rates84 within the
frontier of the U.S. were close to and correlated with those of New York City based on
intermittent data in the 1820s and consistent data after the mid-1830s.85
U.S. financial markets were integrated by the time free banking started in Illinois, so free
banks were able to engage in portfolio rebalancing based on bond price changes and their
effectiveness in doing so can be assessed. If updated information on bonds and other financial
products in New York was known by the Illinois free banks, there would be enough information
for a free bank to engage in efficient financial practices such as diversification and to compare
the risk return profile between the different securities in the asset class of U.S. and state bonds.
These banks would also be knowledgeable about how particular bonds’ prices reacted during
previous declines in the bond market during financial panics. They would therefore be able to
determine which bonds were safer and could increase their security allocation to those bonds that
were less risky so they could survive financial turmoil. Using financial measures such as valueat-risk and the Sharpe ratio allows banks’ behavior to be quantified and their actions can be
compared to the information publically available to free banks at any given point in time.
While private bankers during this period lent to the manufacturing, farming, and
merchant communities, they were not that well known in the financial centers of New York and
London.86 However, corresponding banking between private banks and exchange brokers
enabled the discounting of bills of exchange and promissory notes and the brokering of state
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banknotes, which helped integrate regional financial markets.87 Corresponding bankers in cities
were also involved in discounting and purchasing government and corporate securities.88 Loans
initiated by country banks of balances held by city correspondents and the discounting of bills in
rural areas with eastern correspondents were also important factors in the integration of financial
markets prior to the Civil War.89 Thus, free banks had access to corresponding relationships with
other banks to make portfolio changes through transactions in New York and knowledge of
interest rate developments and free banks’ financial conditions was also available.
In contrast to the Panic of 1837, when regional financial markets had collapsed, during
the Panic of 1847 and Panic of 1857 the markets did not disintegrate.90 Improvements in
communication using the telegraph, as well as coordination among banks’ Southern branches not
only allowed for the market to survive, but also for changes in interest rates to spread across the
country.91 When interest rates on commercial paper were 10% in New Orleans, it only took 4
weeks for the contagion to spread from Wall Street and rates to rise to 24-36% in New Orleans.92
Although financial markets were more likely to continue functioning during crises, the
integration of financial markets made it more likely for a rise of interest rates in one region to
spread throughout the country.
4. Usury Laws
The integration of the financial market by this period in time clashed with state
regulations, in particular the usury laws. When prevailing market interest rates exceed the usury
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ceiling, banks face a portfolio decision: they could charge a rate above the ceiling, either 6 or
7%, and face a lawsuit or they could find alternative ways to extend credit. Law suits, however,
were unlikely in rural areas. The government was not continuing to monitor the interest rates that
banks were charging. Instead, bank clients had to make a complaint that the state’s usury laws
were being violated.93 Since customers desired to maintain business with the bank, they were
unlikely to report the bank for fear that the bank would no longer do business with them.94 In a
small town environment, other banks would also likely avoid doing business with someone who
reported another bank for violation of usury laws.95
In larger cities, significant portfolio adjustments and alternative relationships were made
by banks. Bodenhorn (2007) found that the primary effect of usury restrictions on banks in New
York during the 19th century was less credit availability for high risk borrowers if the interest
rate rose much higher than the usury rate. Bowdenhorn also found that usury rates were not
completely followed, but that the relationship between banks and their clients were of greater
importance. Benmelech, et al. (2008) found that usury did negatively impact the ability of
financial institutions to lend in general; however, usury laws loosened as interest rates rose and
this helped reduce their impact. Since bankers in New York were able to avoid usury, it is
possible Illinois free banks may have also employed those methods, but there are other known
ways that they did this. Usury laws applied to the free banks and not private bankers so free
banks were able to avoid the usury laws by lending banknotes to associated private banks that
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made loans rates higher than the usury rate.96 The purchase of commercial paper was another
method that banks used to avoid the usury rate, as interest rates on such paper were often double
the usury rate.97 Banks could also force customers who take out loans to maintain compensating
balances, which would force them to deposit money with the bank for a few days before
withdraw, effectively increasing the interest rate beyond the usury rate.98
5. Modeling of Risk and Return
Usury laws, even with avoidance, likely influenced the portfolio allocation decisions of
banks and therefore contributed to their portfolio allocations and whether they met a particular
risk-return profile. For antebellum banks, the portfolio allocation decision was not only
constrained by the usury laws, they also face the bond collateral provision of banknotes. Recent
researchers, Economopoulos (1988), Rolnick and Weber (1984), and others, have found that the
decline in state bond prices, Southern bonds in particular, led to most of the bank closures and
failures of free banks in Illinois. Public information about the bond portfolios of the banks,
coupled with the general understanding of the bond backing structure of banknotes, presented
antebellum bank managers with a risk-return decision. Furthermore, the call provision in the law
did not give bank managers flexibility during periods of bond price decline which could trigger a
demand on specie. Thus, the bond portfolio choice not only included the risk associated with the
bonds themselves, but also redemption, or liquidity, risk.
Given the uncertainty of the value of the bond collateral, the public’s reaction to bond
prices could force banks into liquidation, even though they were solvent. Consequently, Rolnick
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and Weber and Economopoulos categorized banks leaving the market as “closed” or “failed.”
Closed banks are banks that stopped operating, but that were able to repay their noteholders in
full and therefore were able to manage their portfolios properly, but a problem with liquidity
resulted when a decline in bond prices led the Illinois Auditor to shut down the bank.99 Failed
banks are banks that stopped operating, but banks failed to redeem their noteholders for the full
value of their notes from the holdings of the bonds that they deposited with the Illinois
Auditor.100
Although recognizing the cause of the banks leaving the market ex post is important,
analysis of free banks’ ex ante decision making should help determine whether the banks were
taking undue risk. If banks were taking greater risk, the downturn in prices would result in those
banks failing and unable to repay their noteholders. If banks were more aware of the risk, the
downturn in prices would have resulted in banks closing, and paying off their noteholders in full.
The differences in ex ante bond security allocation between closed and failed banks was
previously examined by Dwyer and Hafer (2003) who used the efficient frontier to find
differences in portfolio allocations, with the banks that failed taking greater risk per unit of return
than those that survived. While this analysis will examine the Sharpe ratio as a risk-return metric
rather than the efficient frontier, it will also use the financial model of value at risk to determine
whether banks’ bond assets were more susceptible to decline during a market downturn.
Diversification allows for financial institutions to reduce their risk due to differences in
correlation for the assets that they hold, while seeking to maintain as high of a return per unit of
risk as possible. The ability of the free bank to choose the security allocation of its bond portfolio
99
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enables it to manage according to the principles of diversification. A banker who purchases only
one kind of bond is facing all the risk associated with the bond and issuer. The risk is measured
by the asset’s standard deviation. If any particular bank was to divide its investment by
purchasing two different bonds, the risk associated with the portfolio is based on the relationship
between the bond returns. If the bond returns are perfectly negatively correlated, so that the bond
increases in value by the exact same percentage as the other decreases, the value of the portfolio
would not change as the bond prices move. If the bond returns are perfectly positively correlated,
the value of the portfolio would increase or decrease by the amount both bonds increase or
decrease. Thus, the risk of the bond portfolio depends on price correlations among the bonds and
the weightings of each bond in the portfolio. The market, expecting to be compensated for the
risk, would price the securities based on their relative risk to the portfolio.
5.1. Value at Risk
Value at risk (VaR) is a financial measure that helps to measure the potential loss in
worst-case scenarios for a portfolio of securities.101 For instance, a measure of 1% VaR102 for
daily returns would find the minimum decline in the value of the portfolio that would occur 1 out
of every 100 observations, while 99 out of every 100 observations would have a decline less than
that figure, would be unchanged or have a gain.103 5% and 1% VaR are the standard measures
that are used in the financial industry.104 For bonds, VaR can be determined using either price
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data or yield data. For this study, price VaR will be used since bond prices are critical to a free
bank's liquidity risk.105
The usage of VaR to assess the risk of banks’ bond portfolios is important since it can
help determine the amount of risk that could be determined ex ante by Illinois free banks prior to
the developments of the Civil War. While some previous studies have alleged that wildcat
banking was the main cause of noteholder losses, it is important to look at the change in price of
bank assets instead if the cause was the decline in bond prices rather than the fraud of wildcat
bankers. The anticipation of the Civil War itself drove the prices down for fear of the ability of
states to pay back their debts. For this reason, value at risk should be a useful measure of how
banks could have perceived their ability to survive a substantial downturn in the prices of bonds.
While the financial measure of value at risk did not become a prominent measure to calculate
riskiness of a portfolio of securities until 1994106, it should demonstrate the quantity in losses that
banks should have perceived as likely during market downturns. Therefore, it should serve as an
effective measure of losses even during a low probability market destabilizing event.
By using VaR, it can assess the risk associated with a particular bond portfolio and help
examine questions about the banks’ decision making. Since the Illinois Auditor could make calls
for additional bonds or notes if the value of the bonds deposited drops below the threshold, the
VaR would be an excellent measure to assess the likelihood of a call. Any "public" call by the
Auditor would be a significant signal to the public about the bank's liquidity risk or default
risk.107 For the free bankers, they would be concerned with both the liquidity risk and default risk
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of their bond holdings, but if the public believes that the bank will default on their redemption
promise, it could lead to liquidity risk with their failure to meet redemption.
Given the greater uncertainty in the market due to tensions emerging among the U.S.
states, two hypotheses are examined.
Hypothesis #1: As the Civil War became more likely, banks adjusted their bond portfolio
for the increased risk by holding lower VaR portfolios between 1858 and 1860.
Hypothesis #2: As the Civil War became more likely, VaRs are likely to be higher in
banks holding a higher percentage of Southern bonds.
5.2. Sharpe Ratio
The risk as measured by the VaR would suggest greater exposure, but individual bankers
may be willing to accept such risk if they were compensated for it. The Sharpe ratio will be used
to help determine the efficacy of the decision-making of the Illinois Free Banks regarding their
bond portfolios. In order to measure the tradeoff between risk and return, the formula used for
the Sharpe Ratio in the analysis is as follows:
SR = 1 Month Holding Period Return - Risk Free Return
Standard Deviation of 1 Month HPR
It will demonstrate whether Illinois free banks were taking appropriate risk given the
expected return per standard deviation of its bond holdings. Gold specie with no return will be
counted as the risk free asset, since the noteholders of the Illinois free banks had to be redeemed

a bond price decline was temporary. The Banker's Magazine in April 1860 suggests this to the reader regarding a
recent call in Illinois.
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in gold specie. Therefore, the excess return will be the same as the actual one month holding
period return for each free bank's portfolio.
Hypothesis #3: Banks' Sharpe ratios are likely to be negatively correlated with the
bank's VaR
There are a number of caveats that impact both the usage of VaR and Sharpe ratios.
Although VaR will capture the price risk associated with the bond portfolio, it does not capture
the total price risk of the bank. Consequently, there are a few potential reasons that free banks
would be willing to hold portfolios with relatively high VaRs. First, the free bank had the ability
to offset a potential decline in their bond portfolio through their security allocations among their
non-bond assets. They could manage their loan portfolio by holding more short-term and liquid
loans, higher gold specie reserves, or not circulate the maximum amount of notes that they could
issue legally. Second, a VaR may appear high, but not high enough that it would trigger a call by
the auditor, requiring note redemption or the deposit of additional bonds by the free bank. Under
those circumstances, free banks would not need to be as cautious.
Third, the potential of a large decline in the value of a bond portfolio in a short period
would also be less impactful if it was thought to be transitory. For instance, the Panic of 1857
was a relatively short-term liquidity risk in a financial panic and some states stepped in to protect
banks by suspending specie payments until markets returned to normal, but the 1860-61 bond
price decline was different since the default risk of bonds became highly probable.108 The degree
to which free banks would have recognized the permanence of the decline and the timing of this
recognition is important, since banks would be more likely to adjust in response to increased
108
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default risk. Fourth, VaR risk generally measures the historical risk at the current evaluation of
the bond portfolio. However, for the free banker, the risk that it faces is evaluated at the book
value of the portfolio. Banks would need to deposit additional securities or redeem notes if their
notes outstanding did not have sufficient collateral. If a bank’s bonds had already appreciated or
depreciated since banknotes were issued, the book value on a bank’s balance sheet may not
accurately show the value of losses and risk of a call that a bank could face.
Fifth, the geographic location of a bank could lead to a different security allocation for
more intangible reasons, such as a bank wanting to generate good will in a neighboring state
where they do business. For instance, a greater purchase of Missouri state bonds for free banks in
Illinois that are closer to the Missouri border could therefore be an efficient allocation of
resources for that particular even if its Sharpe ratio is lower.
Finally, individual free banks could have lower risk based on their asset allocation to gold
specie reserves and loans. If a bank held greater specie reserves, that bank would be more able to
satisfy net demand for gold specie on any given day and therefore a decline in their bond
portfolio would be less likely to compromise their ability to redeem noteholders. Banks
apparently deviating from the frontier by taking greater risk for an expected return could be
holding greater specie reserves to compensate for greater risk in their bond portfolio. Greater
asset allocation to loans could be another way that free banks could offset greater standard
deviation in their bond portfolio, as the loans made by the bank could be relatively low risk loans
and they also allow for greater asset diversification in the bank’s portfolio. The loans would also
be a shorter term asset versus bond holdings, allowing a free bank to meet redemption for
banknotes sooner than holdings of other assets. Given these caveats, two additional hypotheses
are examined:
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Hypothesis #4: Free banks' were able to offset their risky bond holdings with greater
holdings of safer non-bond assets, such as loans, or by issuing less than the maximum amount of
banknotes allowed by law
Hypothesis #5: The closer a bank was to a neighboring state, such as Missouri, the more
likely they are willing to hold their bonds.
5.3. Monthly Net Bond Flows
Finally, although the previous measures of risk can determine ex ante risks, they are
based on historical information. Changes in the current market and expected market are not fully
captured by these measures. To capture expectations of bankers, we can examine the changes in
bond flows. Correlations can be calculated based on what any particular state's bond was
yielding in a particular month with the net bond flows; that is subtracting bond outflows from
any bond inflows. This is another way of determining whether the bankers were responding to
any increased risk or they continued to pursue yield. Given the tensions emerging among the
U.S. states, another hypothesis is examined:
Hypothesis #6: Free banks purchased lower yielding, lower risk bonds during any
particular month, after the nomination of Lincoln in May of 1860.
6. Data and Analysis
Data was gathered from several sources and are given in Table 1. Dwyer, et al. included
weekly prices of Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, and Virginia state bonds from October 1856 to October 1860. Additional information
from Bankers’ Magazine (1856) included limited information on the prices of Illinois state
bonds, primarily twice monthly updates in prices during 1855 and was also used for the value at
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risk calculation. The bond price data from Dwyer, et al. was generally available weekly during
the March 1855 to October 1860 period. When data from one week was not available, that
respective week was omitted from the calculation of standard deviation, correlation coefficient,
and ultimately value at risk.
Table 1: Bond Price Data during the Antebellum Period of Bonds Held by the Illinois Banks
Source

Period

Bonds

Availability

Dwyer, Hafer, &
Weber
Banker's
Magazine
American Railroad
Journal

Weekly from
1855-1861
Bimonthly 18551861
Weekly 18561858, 3/1859

GA, KY, LA, MO, NC,
OH, VA, TN, US
IL47, NY

Very consistent, occasional missing
observations
Very limited - IL47 and NY after 1859

GA, KY, LA, MO, NC,
OH, TN, IL47, NY

Sylla, Wilson, &
Wright

Weekly 18571860

SC, MI, MN, IA, IL6

IL47, NY: Consistent data 1856-1859
Others: Consistent, filled missing
observations from Dwyer, et al. series
IL6: 2 years, MI: Over 1 year
MN, IA: Less than 1 year
SC: Scattered for few months at a time

Sources: Gerald P. Dwyer, Jr., et al. Weekly U.S. and State Bond Prices. Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis. http://alfred.stlouisfed.org/release?rid=264. J. Smith Homans , ed. The Bankers’ Magazine and
Statistical Registrar. Vol. 13 (Vol. 8 New Series) 1858-1859. Henry Poor, ed. American Railroad
Journal. Vol. 29-32: New York: J.H. Schultz, 1856-1859. Richard E. Sylla, Jack Wilson, and Robert E.
Wright. "Price Quotations in Early U.S. Securities Markets, 1790-1860." Economic History Association.
http://eh.net/database/early-u-s-securities-prices/

In addition to the existing data that I have consolidated from other sources, I have also
found additional sources of information in archives of the American Railroad Journal. While the
Railroad Journal primarily listed the prices of railroad securities, there were also prices of U.S.
and state securities from around 1855 to 1861. This additional information helped to fill gaps
within the data of the existing sources and allowed for the continuity of prices that was needed in
order to have reliable figures for changes in prices from week to week.
For the overall VaR calculation, a normal distribution of returns was assumed and the 1%
VaRs were calculated using a z-score. Some correlations between the bond price movements of
different states were not available, generally in states that had limited holdings such as Iowa,
Michigan, and Minnesota where there was limited availability of bond price data. Some
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correlations, price movements, and holding period return movements were also omitted where
certain bonds had limited availability of price data, such as bonds issued for canals, South
Carolina bonds, and alternate bond issues by Illinois.
Where information on state securities was still intermittent between different weeks,
however, a graduation of prices was used to fill the weekly gaps in prices so that correlations and
price changes for different states’ bond prices could be found. Finally, in some cases bond prices
did not overlap for a limited number of periods. For correlation analysis, if there was missing
information that was needed to find a correlation: two types of bond price proxies were
calculated. One proxy was the multiplication of common correlations. For instance, there was no
pricing data for Michigan during one of the two year periods being examined, and a correlation
between Illinois 6s and Michigan could not be computed. Correlations could be calculated
between Illinois 6s and South Carolina, and South Carolina and Michigan. Thus a proxy for the
correlation between Illinois and Michigan was computed by their multiplication. A second proxy
was the substitution of a correlation that most reflected the two bonds. Missing data on some of
the Illinois bonds prevented correlation calculation. Data was available for two similar bonds in
New York and their correlations were used. A simple average of the prices of the two other
Illinois state securities was used as a proxy for an Illinois bond issue, the Interest 1860 bond,
since default risk was likely similar to the other Illinois bond issues and correlations should have
been similar. Additionally, for correlation analysis, if there was missing information that was
needed to find a correlation in bond prices. The information for the vast majority of bonds was
available, however, and for the ones where the pricing data was scarce only represented a small
fraction of the Illinois banks’ portfolios.
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Data for monthly net bond flows was gathered from the Auditor's ledgers on bond
registrations. In these ledgers, the date, state, and the amount in par value of the bond was
recorded. The ledger also included the date that the bonds were withdrawn. These ledgers were
the basis of the free banks' annual reports to the legislature. Using the annual report of October
of 1858 and calculating monthly totals for all of the free banks during the November 1858 to
October 1860 period, a monthly portfolio can be calculated and a net flow of bonds by the
banking system as a whole in each month can also be determined.109
6.1 Bond Portfolios
The bond portfolios of the Illinois banks were composed of a variety of state and U.S.
bonds that could be used as collateral for their issue of banknotes. The following table represents
an overall summary of the bond holdings of the Illinois free banks in November of 1858 and
November of 1860.
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Table 2: Composition of the Illinois Free Bank Portfolios
State/Country

Percent in 11/1858

Percent in 11/1860

Virginia

11.61%

9.1%

Georgia

1.2%

2.3%

Missouri

49.5%

24.2%

Ohio

2.9%

2.1%

Kentucky

0.2%

0.4%

Louisiana

5.5%

3.7%

North Carolina

4.2%

6.13%

South Carolina

1.5%

0.7%

Tennessee

10.3%

22.8%

Illinois

10%

15.9%

Iowa

1.3%

0.7%

Michigan

1.8%

3.7%

Minnesota

0.1%

1.0%

New York

0%

2.06%

U.S.

0%

5.2%

By analyzing the changes in price of these bond issues over time, as well as the amount
of holdings each bank had in each bond, the amount of any given bank's bond portfolio at risk
based on its price history and correlation scan be calculated. Additionally, the amount of return
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for every unit of risk, using the standard deviation as a measure of risk, can be calculated, which
can also be used to compare between banks and time periods.
6.2. Value at Risk
The empirical analysis below will compare the VaR for a particular bank and the
composition of their bond portfolio. Hypothesis #1 suggests that banks in Illinois will adjust their
portfolios such that they would reduce their VaR as they approached the Civil War, and
hypothesis #2 suggests that banks holding a high allocation of Southern bonds and did not have
high VaR figures, they were ex ante diversified. If the high VaRs are associated with a high
allocation of southern bonds, it indicates they were not ex ante diversified. These banks,
however, may have been able to offset this risk in other parts of their balance sheet, based on
their allocation to loans, specie, and what percentage of notes they were issuing from bond
holdings. Banks with portfolios that had low VaRs may have increased their risk in other parts of
their balance sheet; however, so those factors should be evaluated for these banks as well.
The 1858 value at risk for Illinois free banks’ bond portfolios was calculated based on the
banks’ holdings in November of 1858 and the weekly changes in the bonds’ prices during the
approximately two year period from October 31, 1856 to October 29, 1858. The 1860 value at
risk for Illinois free banks’ bond portfolios was calculated based on the banks’ holdings in
November of 1860 and the weekly changes in the bonds’ prices during the approximately two
year period from November 5, 1858 to October 26, 1860. This allows for a similar period of
price changes in order to compare the two periods. The 1856 to 1858 period includes the Panic of
1857, showing what bank managers could have expected their potential losses to be in the event
of a rapid decline in prices. After evaluating changes in prices during declines, including
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financial panics and political risk events, it can serve as a quantitative measure of how managers
should have viewed the riskiness in their portfolios. While the 1858 to 1860 period does not
include a period of financial panic, it shows changes that banks made with their portfolio over
time that changed their risk relative to the market. It will also demonstrate whether the
composition of their portfolio changed their value at risk over time. For the VaRs in 1860, the
Illinois free banks also divided into banks that were already in existence in November of 1858,
or "old" banks, and those banks that entered between November of 1858 and November of 1860,
or "new" banks.
The first VaR measure is based on the total portfolio of bonds hled by the Auditor. This
would represent the total risk of the Illinois free banking system. (See Chart 1.)
Chart 1: VaR for the 1858 and 1860 Total Market Bond Portfolios
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The VaR for the total bond market portfolio in 1858 was 12.46% and was almost three
times greater than the VaR of 4.31% in 1860. The significance of this difference is that a one out
of 100 event in the previous two years could have wiped out any buffer that the law provided in
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the 1858 portfolio while there would have to be over two back to back events in the later period.
This would appear to confirm the hypothesis that banks made adjustments between 1858 and
1860 to lower their VaR. This significant difference is not surprising since the period between
1858 and 1860 was one of relative calm, while the period proceeding, however, included the
panic of 1857 that had already ended by November of 1858. There are other factors that must be
considered, however, including distinctions between the new and old banks as well as whether it
was the difference in price changes during the 1856-1858 period versus the 1858-1860 period
that contributed to the decrease in VaR. The analysis of those other factors is examined further
by examining the portfolios between old and new banks.
Charts 2 and 3: Average VaR and Southern Allocation Differences Between New and Old
Banks in 1860
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As Chart 2 shows, the average 1860 value at risk for old banks was 5.58% versus 4.53%
for new banks. For the purpose of this analysis, Southern states include Virginia, Georgia,
Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Missouri. The average percentage
holdings of Southern bonds in 1860 for new banks was 60.98% versus 77.66% for banks that had
already been in existence. This indicates that new banks were tending to allocate less toward
Southern bonds overall.
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6.3. Value at Risk, Year of Bank Entry, and Southern Bond Holdings
Since old banks had both greater Southern bond holdings and value-at-risk, comparing
the value-at-risk for each free bank with its holdings of Southern bonds could help show how
much a bank's Southern bond holdings contributed to an increased price risk for each bank. The
correlation coefficient between each bank's value-at-risk in 1860 and the percent of their
Southern bond holdings was 0.54, with a slightly stronger correlation for new banks than old
banks. Since the correlations for the old and new banks were slightly different, including whether
a bank was new and old can show whether when a bank entered the market also contributed to
the banking system's value-at-risk. A regression was run with the 1860 VaR of each bank as the
dependent variable and a dummy variable indicating whether it is a net or old bank, and the
percent of Southern bonds as the independent variable. The results were as follows:
Dependent Variable:

V = Value at risk of the free bank in 1860

Independent Variables: Y = Dummy variable for old and new banks
("old" around by 1858 = 0, "new" around by 1860 = 1)
S = Percentage holdings of Southern bonds in 1860
V = 4.283 - 0.77Y +0.01667S
t = 16.05 -3.818 5.85
Adjusted R2 = 36.78% Observations = 106
The results indicate that when any bank, new or old, held an increased proportion of
Southern bonds in its portfolio, an increased value at risk is also indicated. A portfolio of 100%
southern bonds would increase the bank's VaR by 1.66 or about an increase of 39% over a bank
with no Southern bonds. Furthermore old banks selected a portfolio with a higher VaR than
newer banks holding the percent of Southern bonds constant. An old bank on average held a
portfolio with a VaR that was 0.77% higher than a new bank. Although this is statistically
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significant, it is not practically significant. 36.78% of the change in banks' value-at-risk was
explained by the independent variables, with a bank's holdings of Southern bonds being a
stronger association than whether a bank was new or old, although both factors are significant.
There was a significant drop in VaR among the banks from 1858 to 1860. However, this
could have been due to the general calm in the market and not any active management on the
part of bankers. The VaR for the total market portfolio of all the free banks in 1858 was 12.46%,
indicating that 1% of the time that the total market portfolio would lose that much percent in a
week. To determine if banks' choices increased or decreased risk over the period, a VaR
benchmark for the 1860 analysis was created using the portfolio weights of the total market
portfolio of 1858. Thus, any change in the benchmark would be due to pure price changes and
not portfolio adjustments. Comparing the results showed that the benchmark VaR dropped from
12.46% (blue) to 5.09% (red) in 1860. The drop showed a strong calming of the market as the
VaR value decreased greatly. Additionally, an old bank total portfolio VaR using the portfolio
weights of all of the old banks based on their holdings in 1860 was created. Weighting the total
portfolio of the old banks based on their holdings in 1860 allows their results to be compared
more directly to the 1858 benchmark VaR. The old banks VaR in 1860 dropped to 5.00%
(green), only 9 basis points lower than the benchmark during the same period.
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Chart 4: Average VaR Based On Total Market Portfolios in 1858 and 1860
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While the difference between the benchmark and actual allocation of the old banks were
small, it suggests that there was some activity that adjusted the weights in their portfolio. New
banks that entered over the 1858-1860 period are also included in the VaR for the total market
portfolio, which shows a drop in the overall system-wide risk to 4.69% (purple). This implies
that the new banks reduced their risk more than the old banks did during the same period. It
would appear that the old banks were taking more risk with their portfolios than the new banks.
Looking at whether banks were adequately awarded for taking greater risk can help show
whether they were taking undue risk.
6.4. Sharpe Ratio
The risk exposure of the free bank appears to be relatively high in 1858 and much less so
in 1860. Without regulations, banks can choose to accept risk if there is sufficient compensation.
The Sharpe ratio will demonstrate this. The overall Sharpe ratio results for all of the banks in the
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November 1858 and November 1860 analysis can be found in the Data Appendix. Comparison
and analysis of the Sharpe ratio results in both 1858 and 1860 are included in this section.
Chart 5: Sharpe Ratios Based On 1858 and 1860 Total Market Portfolios
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Overall, the Sharpe ratio for the Illinois free banks was higher for the total market
portfolio in 1858 at 66.1% (blue) than it was in 1860 at 24.7% (red). This indicates that the bond
portfolios overall were receiving greater return per unit of risk during the 1856-1858 period
versus the 1858-1860 period. However, if the weights of the 1858 portfolio are used to calculate
the Sharpe ratio in 1860, the ratio falls to 20.7% (green). Thus, the banks appeared to have
underperformed the total market in 1860 if they kept the same weights that they had in 1858.
Since the old banks also had the greater value-at-risk in 1860, during the same period of time,
when compared directly with the new banks during the same time period, they appear to have
been taking greater risk. To test whether the market Sharpe ratio decline is influenced by new
banks entering the market, a regression is run
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Using the Sharpe ratio as the dependent variable and the year is set to 0 for old and 1 for
new being the independent variable, it can be determined whether old or new banks had a better
return for every unit of risk. The result of the regression was as follows:
Dependent Variable: SR = Sharpe ratio of the free bank in 1860
Independent Variables: Y = Dummy variable for old and new banks
("old" around by 1858 = 0, "new" around by 1860 = 1)
SR = 0.345 + 0.066Y
t=

7.07

2.69

Adjusted R2 = 5.63% Observations = 106

`

The results indicate that the new banks had a better return for every unit of risk, since an

new bank is estimated to have a Sharpe ratio of 41.1% versus a 34.5% Sharpe ratio for a old
bank. Thus, the portfolio allocation and any changes made during the 1858-1860 period were not
enough for the old banks, as the new banks outperformed them. The adjusted R2 figure indicates
that a bank being old or new offers some, although fairly low, explanatory power in determining
whether a bank makes a greater return for every unit of risk. Since new banks had a higher
Sharpe ratio than the old banks and it was the old banks that had a greater value at risk, this
indicates that the new banks had both had lower downside risk and had a greater return for every
unit of risk.
Additionally, comparing the average Sharpe ratio of the old banks in 1858 and in 1860
can be used to show the change in the risk return tradeoff for the banks over time. The average
Sharpe ratio on average for an old bank with their portfolio in 1860 was 19.45% versus a 67.43%
Sharpe ratio on average for an old bank with their portfolio in 1858. The decline in the banks'
Sharpe ratio indicates less return per unit of risk for the banks during the 1860 period.

Clayman 41
Tracking how much the 1860 Sharpe ratio of a bank changed based on its allocation to
Southern bonds can help evaluate the Southern bond allocation of the Illinois free banks further.
While the old banks had higher VaRs and higher allocation to Southern bonds than the new
banks in 1860, evaluating whether the free banks received an adequate return for greater
allocation to Southern bonds is also important. It can also help show whether the correlation
between increased Southern bond allocation for all the banks in 1860 and greater value at risk is
also echoed here. The results are as follows:
Dependent Variable:

SR = Sharpe ratio of the free bank in 1860

Independent Variables: SO = Percent of the free bank's bonds in Southern bonds in 1860
SR = 0.3983 - 0.2155SO
t=

10.39

-4.35

Adjusted R2 = 14.58% Observations = 106
Although it only explains a portion of the change in banks' Sharpe ratios, the results of
the equation are significant. A greater allocation to Southern bonds is associated with a decrease
in the Sharpe ratio, or the banks' risk-return tradeoff. Therefore, banks tended not to receive
adequate return for every unit of risk if they allocated more into Southern bonds than other state
or U.S. bonds. Bank managers should have had some aversion toward allocating more of their
portfolio toward Southern bonds by 1860 if they recognized the lack of reward they were
receiving by doing so.
Since the Sharpe ratio is being used to see if the amount of downside risk a bank was
taking was offset by greater return per unit of risk, recognizing and accounting differences in the
calculations for both metrics is important. The Sharpe ratio compares a bank's holding period
return on its bond portfolio based on the bonds' yields, since a bond coupons would offset a
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comparable decrease in prices, and changes in price relative to the standard deviation of a bank's
holding period return. On the other hand, the value-at-risk assesses the amount of downside price
risk a bank faced without accounting for a bond's yield. VaR is important for the free bank since
it assesses the immediate nature of a downturn in prices. The average holding period return can
also be compared to a bank's VaR to see if return was offsetting extreme downside risk instead of
changes in holding period return as a modified Sharpe ratio. To see if using this method of using
a modified Sharpe ratio had different results for the results of free banks, a regression was used
and the results were as follows:
Dependent Variable:

SR = Sharpe ratio of the free bank in 1860

Independent Variables:

MSR = Modified Sharpe ratio using VaR as risk measure in 1860
SR = -0.034 - 3.82MSR
t=

-2.33

22.89

Adjusted R2 = 83.28% Observations = 106
The modified Sharpe ratio using VaR as the risk measure in the risk-return calculation is
explained largely by the traditional Sharpe ratio using holding period standard deviation as the
risk measure. Since the traditional Sharpe ratio incorporates standard deviation based on holding
period return standard deviations rather than the price standard deviation that is used in the
calculation of VaR, the benefits of using the modified Sharpe ratio may be offset. While a
modified Sharpe ratio may be necessary if there was a large divergence between the two
measures, the traditional Sharpe ratio seems appropriate for the Illinois free banks.
6.5. Bond Flows From November 1858 to October 1860
The nomination of Lincoln as the Republican candidate for President of the United States
in May have been seen as making Civil War more likely. Since the winner of the Republican

Clayman 43
special election in October of 1860110 indicated growing likelihood of Lincoln winning the
presidential election during the next month, any analysis after that point would likely be banks
mitigating the fallout of the election and subsequent Civil War rather than ex ante decisionmaking. Inclusion of the month of November of 1860 would also include some activity after the
presidential election regardless. Therefore, monthly bond flows are examined during the period
from November of 1858 up through the month of October of 1860.
Hypothesis #7: After May of 1860, the amount of Southern bonds being added by banks
would be expected to be lower if they wished to reduce political risk.
Chart 6: Bond Flows During the November 1858 to October 1860 Period
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Given that the allocation of the total market bond portfolio toward Southern bonds was
84% in 1860, the flows reflect a trend toward increasing allocation toward Northern bonds. This
may appear to reflect some confirmation of Hypothesis #1 since banks seemed to be trying to

110

There were indications of this in Bankers' Magazine in October 1860 of the importance of this special election
for Governor. See also for the importance of Pennsylvania in the 1860 Presidential Election : James L. Huston, The
Panic of 1857 and the Coming of the Civil War, (LSU Press, 1999), Chapter 9
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reduce their risk over the period. The Southern allocation of the market portfolio of all of the
banks, while dropping from 84% to 69% in 1860, still was heavily allocated toward risky
Southern bonds. If banks were decreasing their risk, they did not appear to be doing so
sufficiently.
If political risk of bond prices contributed to the banker's expectations, the flow of bonds
would show that banks deposited more Northern bonds relative to Southern after May when
Lincoln became the Republican candidate. Chart 7 shows that the flow of bonds after May for all
banks and the results of banks during their first month of operations after entering during a
particular month.
Chart 7: Bond Flows During the May 1860 to October 1860 Period
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The results indicate that among both banks that were already in operations and those
beginning operations on any particular month, Southern bonds were being added more heavily
than Northern bonds from May 1860 to October 1860. Given that, prior to May of 1860, banks
were adding more Northern bonds versus Southern bonds, it appears that the banks did not
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believe political risk to be increasing or they overlooked while making allocations to their bond
portfolio. While it is somewhat lower for banks entering the market on any given month, they
still favored allocation toward Southern bonds during the period.
One reason that the free banks may have been increasing their allocation toward Southern
bond may have been due to them receiving higher yields during the period during which they
purchased the bonds. By correlating the net inflows, calculated by subtracting the gross inflows
and gross outflows during each month, a correlation with each bond's yield can be calculated.
Taking the average of the correlations for each month results in a correlation of 0.12, which is a
fairly weak positive correlation. Although some banks may have been purchasing riskier bonds
for this reason, it does not seem like they were strongly motivated to by it.
7. Adjustments to Bond Portfolio Risk
7.1. Holdings of Missouri Bonds by the Free Banks
During the Panic of 1857, reports surfaced that the usage of Illinois banknotes declined
despite the Illinois banks holding large quantities of Missouri state bonds.111 This was despite,
before the Panic of 1857, Illinois banknotes had been serving as half of the overall currency in
circulation in Missouri.112 Although in this case Missourians had abandoned their holdings of
Illinois banknotes, they recognized that their abandonment of the Illinois banknotes resulted in a
decline in the value of their own state's bonds. This relationship seemed to indicate that there was
a relationship between the banks and currency in circulation in Illinois and Missouri. Given the
large decline in the Missouri bonds as the Civil War broke out and those bonds accounting for
about 32% of the Illinois free banks' bond holdings as of November 1, 1860, there may have
111
112

“Illinois Banks in St. Louis,” Ottawa Free Trader, October 10, 1857.
Ibid.
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been interstate banking relationships that could help explain some of the Illinois free bank
failures.
Of the 94 banks in the Illinois balance sheet data in November of 1860, 77 were
analyzed, with twelve being excluded due to no information on a municipality's population being
available, two excluded due to the municipality no longer existing, and three excluded due to
lack of bond data availability. Due to the possibility the Illinois banks holding more of its
neighboring state's bonds, the relationship between an Illinois free bank holdings based on the
distance from the individual free banks in Illinois from St. Louis, Missouri was analyzed. The
amount of loans held by a free bank divided by its earnings assets was also considered since a
bank may have chosen to hold more loans to offset the risk of holding the Missouri bonds. The
results were as follows:
Dependent Variable: MB = Percent of Missouri bonds held as a portion of bond portfolio
Independent Variables: D = Distance of the free bank from St. Louis, MO in miles
LEA = Percent of loans held by free bank as a portion of earning assets
MB = 0.1977 + 0.00032D+ 0.06779LEA
t=

1.73

0.502

Adjusted R2 = -0.02144

0.4075
Observations = 77

There was an extremely low amount of explanation for variation in holdings of Missouri
bonds due to the independent variables. The results indicate that a relationship between the
amount of Missouri bonds held was not significant due to the distance of the bank from St. Louis
or the proportion of loans the bank was making. It also indicates that banks would not be more
likely to hold more loans specifically to offset the risk of holding more Missouri bonds. Other
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factors or operational indifference on the part of the free bankers could help explain the variation
in holdings of Missouri bonds.
7.2. Specie Holdings of the Free Banks
Due to the requirement that a free bank be able to repay a noteholder or face the risk of
the Auditor placing the bank into liquidation, holdings of specie were important for free bank
liquidity. Other factors that the bank is taking that could potentially increase the overall risk the
bank faces may have influenced the likelihood of the bank to hold more gold specie on reserve.
For instance, banks that held a greater proportion of Missouri bonds would seem more likely to
hold specie to offset the price risk of their bond holdings. Banks with a greater distance from St.
Louis would also seem more likely to hold less specie since there would be a decline in Missouri
Additionally, banks located in a city or town would seem more likely to hold specie if that
municipality had a higher population. Banks that were more isolated would be less likely to face
an immediate demand for specie due to their physical isolation.
Of the 94 banks in the Illinois balance sheet data in November of 1860, 77 were
analyzed, with twelve being excluded due to no information on a municipality's population being
available, two excluded due to the municipality no longer existing, and three excluded due to
lack of bond data availability. The results were as follows:
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Dependent Variable: SBN = Percent gold specie held by the bank as a portion of banknotes
Independent Variables: D = Distance of the free bank from St. Louis, MO in miles
MB = Percent of Missouri bonds held as a portion of bond portfolio
P = Population of the municipality as of the 1860 Census

SBN = 0.1706 - 0.00068D+ 0.12518MB + 7.42x10-6P
t=

0.959

-0.658

Adjusted R2 = -0.0079

0.6893

1.383

Observations = 77

There was an extremely low amount of explanation for percent holdings of gold as a
portion of banknotes due to distance, Missouri bond holdings, and population of the
municipality. Given this, it appears that distance from St. Louis and percent holdings of Missouri
bonds did not impact a free bank's allocation into its holdings of specie reserves. Additionally,
the population of a municipality did not appear to impact its likelihood to hold greater amounts
of gold as a percentage of its banknotes. Bank managers did not appear to weigh these other
factors that could potentially impact likelihood of customers to demand specie for their
banknotes when determining how much gold specie to hold in reserve.
8. Conclusions
The Illinois free banks made adjustments during the period from 1858 to 1860. Although
the old banks lowered their allocations of Southern bonds, this only helped to reduce their valueat-risk slightly than if the old banks had held their total portfolio constant from 1858 to 1860. Of
all the banks in 1860, higher allocations into Southern bonds were associated with lower Sharpe
ratios. Since holding the 1858 total market portfolio constant also resulted in a lower Sharpe ratio
than the 1860 total market portfolio, this appears to be consistent during any one period.
Although the Sharpe ratios were higher overall in 1858, the higher VaR offsets that benefit, with
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the increased risk of holding Southern bonds closer to 1860 making portfolio adjustments
necessary in order to reduce risk. Banks only reduced their Southern net flows during the 18581860 period somewhat, so it appears that they were taking undue risk by continuing to hold those
bonds as part of their portfolio. This also appears true after May of 1860, since Southern bond
net flows actually increase between then and the Pennsylvania special election as well as the
presidential election in November.
Free banks did not offset their greater holdings of Missouri bonds with greater holdings
of gold specie nor were there indications that proximity to St. Louis, Missouri led to greater
holdings of Missouri debt. Since Missouri bonds were such a large portion of the free banks'
portfolio in 1858 and still were large in 1858, standard allocation or indifference to
disproportionate holdings of one state's bonds appeared to lead to this situation.
Although the value at risk is lower for the 1860 total market portfolio versus the 1858
total market portfolio, this was during a time of relatively low volatility and bank managers
should have recognized the risk would be higher during events that drive a large asset price
decline. While financial panics and war are not the same, war actually being worse, the value at
risk does serve as an important measure given that it should have served as at least a minimum
estimate of the potential losses the bank could face in one week. Since war would seem to have a
more permanent, or at least longer impact, the Illinois free banks would be less likely to inject
more capital into their bank to keep it afloat. Thus, even though there was a longer term impact
of a civil war versus the shorter effect on financial markets of banking panics, the banks should
have recognized the sharp collapses in bond prices that could occur based on previous financial
panics. The various allocations by the Illinois free banks do appear to have an impact on their
outcome, although other factors also contributed to their ultimate fate.
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Data Appendix
Table 3: Value-at-Risk for the Illinois Free Banks in November 1858
Bank
Value-at-Risk
AGRICLTRE BK
16.36
ALTON BK
18.58
AMER EX BK
12.64
BELVIDERE BK
12.20
BK-AURORA
14.20
BK-BLOOMINGTON
27.64
BK-CARMI
12.32
BK-CHESTER
14.29
BK-COMMONWEALT
14.29
BK-ELGIN
9.95
BK-FED UNION
14.22
BK-GALENA
14.07
BK-GENESEO
13.68
BK-ILL
11.35
BK-NAPERVILLE
13.00
BK-NO ILL
14.29
BK-PERU
14.51
BK-PIKE CO
12.71
BK-QUINCY
14.47
BK-RALIEGH
13.92
BK-REPUBLIC
11.71
BK-SO ILL
13.92
CENTRAL BK
19.71
CITIZENS' BK
13.83
CITY BK,OTTAWA
12.24
CORN EXCHANGE
13.84
EDGAR CO BK
13.64
EJ TINKHAM &CO
11.08
FARM & TRADE
10.19
FRONTIER BK
13.15
GRAND PRAIRIE
12.14
GRAYVILLE BK
14.10
HIGHLAND BK
12.36
INTERNATIONAL
19.25
LAFAYETTE BK
14.19
MARINE BK
26.51
MCLEAN CO BK
14.29
MERCH & DROVER
13.61
MISS RIVER BK
9.56
MORGAN CO BK
14.04
NATIONAL BK
13.30
PRAIRIE ST BK
13.89
RAILROAD BK
10.29
REED'S BK
14.29
SO BK-ILL,GRYV
9.57
STATE BK-ILL
13.74
WARREN CO BK
14.29
TOTAL MARKET
12.46
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Table 4: Value-at-Risk for the Illinois Free Banks in November 1860
Bank
Value-at-Risk
AGRICLTRE BK
4.53
ALISANA BK
5.24
ALTON BK
4.99
AMERICAN BK
2.73
AMER EX BK
5.95
BK O/ALBION
2.76
BK O/ALEDO
4.23
BK O/AMER,CHCGO
7.58
BK O/AMER,MT.CARMEL
3.93
BK O/AURORA
7.26
BK O/BENTON
5.04
BK O/BLMNGTN
4.40
BK O/BRKLYN
3.59
BK O/CARMI
5.86
BK O/CHESTER
6.93
BK O/COMMERCE
4.57
BK O/CMMNWLTH
7.47
BK O/ELGIN
4.61
BK O/FED UNION
6.31
BK O/GALENA
4.00
BK O/GENESEO
5.39
BK O/ILL,NEW HVN
3.89
BK O/INDEMNITY
3.65
BK O/JCKSN CNTY
4.00
BK O/MTRPLS
4.03
BK O/NAPERVLL
5.45
BK O/NRTHRN ILL*
7.58
BK O/PERU
6.98
BK O/PIKE CNTY
4.83
BK O/QUINCY
7.37
BK O/RALEIGH
6.72
BK O/SO ILL
5.22
BK O/SPARTA
1.95
BK O/REPUBLIC
4.63
BELVIDERE BK
6.76
BULLS HEAD
3.79
CANAL BK
4.98
CENTRAL BK
4.68
CHICAGO BK
3.98
CITIZEN'S BK
7.12
CITY BK,OTTAWA
4.01
COLUMBIAN BK
3.64
COMM BK O/NW HVN
5.32
COMM BK/PALSTN
5.43
COMM BK,CHCGO
5.25
CONTINENTAL BK
4.36
CORN EXCHANGE BK
6.69
CORN PLANTERS' BK
5.05
DOUGLAS BK
5.09
EJ TNKHM & CO BK
6.01
EAGLE BK OF ILL
4.83
EDGAR CNTY BK
4.84
FMS & TRDRS BK,CHLSTN
6.03

Bank
FMRS' BK O/ILL,MTR
FRANKLIN BK
FRONTIER BK
FULTON BK
GARDEN STATE BK
GRAND PRARIE BK
GRAYVILLE BK

Value-at-Risk
5.01
4.47
4.81
4.14
4.52
6.54
6.79
HAMPDEN BK
4.73
HIGHLAND BK
6.45
HUMBOLDT BK
5.19
ILL. CENTRAL BK
3.38
ILL RIVER BK
4.78
ILL ST SCRTY BK
3.58
ILL STATE BK
5.00
INTERNATIONAL BK
2.94
JERSEY COUNTY BK
4.65
KANKAKEE BK
4.57
KASKASKIA BK
5.00
LAFAYETTE BK
6.92
LAKE MICHIGAN BK
3.75
LANCASTER BK
5.26
MARINE BK
3.58
MRSHLL CNTY BK
3.65
MCLEAN CNTY BK
5.21
MERCH & DRVRS BK,JLT
5.73
MERCHANT'S BK,CARMI
3.57
MISS RIVER BK
4.07
MORGAN CNTY BK
6.88
NARRAGANSETT BK
4.41
NATIONAL BK
7.13
NEW MARKET BK
5.43
OHIO RIVER BK
4.70
OLYMPIC BK
3.89
PAMET BK
6.58
PATRIOTIC BK
3.75
PITTSFIELD BL
2.72
PLOWMAN'S BK
5.57
PRARIE STATE BK
4.82
RAILROAD BK
4.50
REAPERS BK
4.97
REED'S BK
7.58
ROCK ISLAND BK
7.58
SHAWANSES BK
4.11
SO BK O/ILL,GRYVL
5.70
STATE BK O/ILL
4.18
STATE STOCK BK
3.94
TOULON BK
3.90
US STOCK BK
4.97
UNION BK,CHCGO
4.89
UNION COUNTY BK
2.87
WARREN COUNTY BK
5.25
WESTERN BK O/ILL
4.91
WHEAT GROWS' BK
5.34
TOTAL MARKET
4.32
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Table 5: Sharpe Ratio for the Illinois Free Banks in November 1858
Bank
Sharpe Ratio
AGRICLTRE BK
70.38%
ALTON BK
68.80%
AMER EX BK
57.54%
GRAYVILLE BK
62.59%
BK-AURORA
63.40%
BK-BLOOMINGTON
58.70%
BK-CARMI
58.69%
BK-CHESTER
62.59%
BK-COMMONWEALT
62.59%
BK-ELGIN
20.15%
BK-FED UNION
62.05%
BK-GALENA
68.48%
BK-GENESEO
54.34%
BK-ILL
71.75%
BK-NAPERVILLE
50.25%
BK-NO ILL
62.59%
BK-PERU
66.48%
BK-PIKE CO
63.88%
BK-QUINCY
68.48%
BK-RALIEGH
62.88%
BK-SO ILL
62.96%
BK-REPUBLIC
47.77%
BELVIDERE BK
58.18%
CENTRAL BK
77.59%
CITIZENS' BK
64.84%
CITY BK,OTTAWA
53.64%
CORN EXCHANGE
63.16%
EJ TINKHAM &CO
54.94%
EDGAR CO BK
61.24%
FARM & TRADE
48.94%
FRONTIER BK
50.17%
GRAND PRAIRIE
58.52%
HIGHLAND BK
138.56%
INTERNATIONAL
73.19%
LAFAYETTE BK
294.15%
MARINE BK
49.49%
MCLEAN CO BK
62.59%
MERCH & DROVER
72.59%
MISS RIVER BK
58.59%
MORGAN CO BK
63.92%
NATIONAL BK
62.85%
PRAIRIE ST BK
60.32%
RAILROAD BK
43.47%
REED'S BK
62.59%
SO BK-ILL,GRYV
71.31%
STATE BK-ILL
69.73%
WARREN CO BK
62.59%
TOTAL MARKET
66.11%
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Table 6: Sharpe Ratio for the Illinois Free Banks in November 1860
Bank
Sharpe Ratio
AGRICLTRE BK
46.11%
ALISANA BK
18.66%
ALTON BK
16.37%
AMERICAN BK
154.01%
AMER EX BK
17.45%
BK O/ALBION
49.51%
BK O/ALEDO
36.38%
BK O/AMER,CHCGO
3.93%
BK O/AMER,MT.CARMEL
25.50%
BK O/AURORA
4.94%
BK O/BENTON
20.10%
BK O/BLMNGTN
65.20%
BK O/BRKLYN
30.00%
BK O/CARMI
14.10%
BK O/CHESTER
6.85%
BK O/COMMERCE
32.87%
BK O/CMMNWLTH
4.36%
BK O/ELGIN
28.00%
BK O/FED UNION
8.09%
BK O/GALENA
21.90%
BK O/GENESEO
10.45%
BK O/ILL,NEW HVN
46.67%
BK O/INDEMNITY
41.09%
BK O/JCKSN CNTY
25.69%
BK O/MTRPLS
26.92%
BK O/NAPERVLL
15.42%
BK O/NRTHRN ILL*
3.93%
BK O/PERU
7.25%
BK O/PIKE CNTY
19.37%
BK O/QUINCY
5.00%
BK O/RALEIGH
9.02%
BK O/SO ILL
16.31%
BK O/SPARTA
99.51%
BK O/REPUBLIC
25.21%
BELVIDERE BK
9.28%
BULLS HEAD
30.75%
CANAL BK
21.89%
CENTRAL BK
36.60%
CHICAGO BK
20.41%
CITIZEN'S BK
5.85%
CITY BK,OTTAWA
28.19%
COLUMBIAN BK
38.26%
COMM BK O/NW HVN
22.89%
COMM BK/PALSTN
26.89%
COMM BK,CHCGO
18.52%
CONTINENTAL BK
25.71%
CORN EXCHANGE BK
7.04%
CORN PLANTERS' BK
28.16%
DOUGLAS BK
20.93%
EJ TNKHM & CO BK
35.76%
EAGLE BK OF ILL
20.92%
EDGAR CNTY BK
26.09%
FMS & TRDRS BK,CHLSTN
20.51%

Bank
FMRS' BK O/ILL,MTR
FRANKLIN BK
FRONTIER BK
FULTON BK
GARDEN STATE BK
GRAND PRARIE BK
GRAYVILLE BK

Sharpe Ratio
18.29%
33.41%
22.19%
42.89%
25.31%
10.23%
6.79%
HAMPDEN BK
23.05%
HIGHLAND BK
-7.79%
HUMBOLDT BK
21.58%
ILL. CENTRAL BK
33.47%
ILL RIVER BK
21.82%
ILL ST SCRTY BK
27.05%
ILL STATE BK
25.07%
INTERNATIONAL BK
53.61%
JERSEY COUNTY BK
32.64%
KANKAKEE BK
23.92%
KASKASKIA BK
20.86%
LAFAYETTE BK
7.90%
LAKE MICHIGAN BK
32.15%
LANCASTER BK
18.42%
MARINE BK
30.43%
MRSHLL CNTY BK
52.56%
MCLEAN CNTY BK
14.06%
MERCH & DRVRS BK,JLT
22.02%
MERCHANT'S BK,CARMI
34.25%
MISS RIVER BK
35.20%
MORGAN CNTY BK
6.29%
NARRAGANSETT BK
26.25%
NATIONAL BK
5.71%
NEW MARKET BK
20.47%
OHIO RIVER BK
22.26%
OLYMPIC BK
42.89%
PAMET BK
6.78%
PATRIOTIC BK
31.20%
PITTSFIELD BL
28.76%
PLOWMAN'S BK
21.27%
PRARIE STATE BK
30.41%
RAILROAD BK
27.46%
REAPERS BK
19.18%
REED'S BK
3.93%
ROCK ISLAND BK
3.93%
SHAWANSES BK
31.02%
SO BK O/ILL,GRYVL
12.07%
STATE BK O/ILL
31.72%
STATE STOCK BK
38.26%
TOULON BK
36.45%
US STOCK BK
19.18%
UNION BK,CHCGO
20.30%
UNION COUNTY BK
36.55%
WARREN COUNTY BK
12.45%
WESTERN BK O/ILL
20.20%
WHEAT GROWS' BK
11.30%
TOTAL MARKET
24.67%
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